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OPINION OF THE COURT 
               
 
GREENBERG, Circuit Judge. 
 
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
 A. Factual History 
 Lawrence E. Bathgate, II, borrowed over $19 million 
from the First National Bank of Toms River, N.J. (the Bank) 
between 1986 and 1990.  These loans were evidenced by the 
following seven promissory notes: 
 1.  a $185,000 promissory note secured by a 1985 
Rolls Royce; 
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 2. a $1,620,000 promissory note secured by a mortgage 
on property in Mantoloking, N.J.; 
 3. a $2.0 million promissory note secured by 
mortgages on two properties located on Buena Vista Drive in 
Rumson, N.J.; 
 4. a $4.0 million "Line of Credit Master Note" 
payable on demand and secured by assignments of a $1.6 million 
note and mortgage executed by Airport Associates and a $6,280,000 
note and mortgage executed by Gerald A. Gura; 
 5. a $187,500 promissory note; 
 6. an $11.5 million line of credit secured by 
  (a) second mortgages, security agreements, and 
assignments of rent on two properties located on Buena Vista 
Drive in Rumson, N.J.; 
  (b) a second mortgage, security agreement, and 
assignment of rent on property located in Mantoloking, N.J.; 
  (c) a mortgage, security agreement, and 
assignment of rent on property located in Howell, N.J., executed 
by Tuscol Development, Inc.; 
  (d) a mortgage, security agreement, and 
assignment of rent on a second piece of property in Howell, N.J., 
executed by Old Monmouth Associates; 
  (e) a collateral assignment of partnership 
interest on properties located in Freehold, N.J., and Jackson, 
N.J.; 
  (f)  a collateral assignment of partnership 
interest in Vintage-Pointe Associates; 
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  (g) a collateral assignment of a partnership 
interest in Bedford Village Associates; and 
  (h) a collateral assignment of a partnership 
interest by Novasau Associates in itself and in NLA Associates; 
and 
 7. a $250,000 promissory note payable on demand. 
Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Bathgate et al., Civ. No. 91-2779 
(consolidated), Memorandum and Order at 2-3 (D.N.J. Mar. 18, 
1993) (see Bathgate defendants' App. I at 19-20).   
 In 1989, Bathgate also executed an unconditional 
guaranty securing 25 percent of a $1.8 million "Agreement for 
Commercial Letter of Credit" between NLA Associates, LGP-I 
Limited Partnership, and Novasau Associates and the Bank.  Id. at 
3 (see Bathgate defendants' App. I at 20).0  Alan B. Landis 
secured the remainder of this obligation to the Bank.  
 Bathgate defaulted on the $11,500,000 note by failing 
to make the required monthly and quarterly payments beginning on 
October 1, 1990.  On February 15, 1991, Bathgate also defaulted 
on the $187,500 note by failing to make the required monthly 
payment. 
 On February 26, 1991, the Bank wrote a 13-page letter 
to Bathgate regarding the $11,500,000 note, the $187,500 note, 
                     
0Pursuant to the "Agreement for Commercial Letter of Credit," NLA 
Associates, LGP-I Limited Partnership, and Novasau Associates 
agreed to pay the Bank on demand such amounts as the Bank paid to 
Chase Manhattan Bank pursuant to a $1,800,000 letter of credit 
issued by the Bank in favor of Chase.  NLA also executed an 
undated demand promissory note in the amount of $l,800,000.  The 
Bank advanced $1,688,178 under the terms of the letter of credit. 
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the $4,000,000 note, the $250,000 note, and the $1,800,000 
unconditional guaranty.  See Bathgate defendants' App. II at 629. 
This letter is at the heart of this action.  The letter begins by 
stating that the Bank "has agreed to modify and consolidate" 
these obligations, and the majority of the letter details the 
terms and conditions of the modification.  Id.  The letter was 
signed by William Carlough, Senior Vice President, and indicated 
that he sent copies to Douglas Johnson, the Bank's President and 
CEO, and Charles R. Berman, an attorney at Bourne, Noll & Kenyon. 
Id. at 642.   
 The following are the most significant provisions of 
the letter: (1) the "commitment" was subject to Bathgate's 
"acceptance and return to the Bank, fully executed, by 2/26/91," 
id. at 641; (2) the "commitment shall expire and shall be of no 
further effect if the transactions contemplated by this 
commitment are not closed by 4/1/91," id.; (3) the "bank shall be 
represented in this transaction by the firm of Bourne, Noll & 
Kenyon, . . . which will prepare all documents in this 
transaction," id. at 637; and (4) "[t]he Borrower and the Bank 
shall execute and deliver all documentation required by the Bank 
in connection with the issuance of the Loan and the 
Collateral[,]" id.  The February letter also identifies specific 
documents Bathgate was to furnish to the Bank counsel prior to 
the closing of the transactions contemplated by the letter, id. 
at 635-37 (see also Bathgate defendants' App. II at 603-05), 639-
7 
40,0 and states that Bathgate must provide "[s]uch other 
information, documents, certificates, financial statements or 
opinions reasonably required by the Bank and its counsel," id. at 
637. 
 Though Bathgate executed and delivered the February 
letter to the Bank on February 26, 1991, the proposed 
restructured loan never was closed.  In a letter dated April 11, 
1991, the Bank formally demanded payment of two notes on which 
Bathgate had failed to make payments (the $11,500,000 note and 
                     
0These include the following items: (1) title insurance policies 
insuring the Bank's lien interest in the mortgaged properties; 
(2) insurance policies against hazards on the mortgaged 
properties; (3) insurance policies against floods on any areas 
designated as flood hazard areas; (4) proof that the mortgaged 
properties are not subject to the Environmental Cleanup 
Responsibility Act or other applicable environmental law and that 
all taxes and assessments against the properties have been paid; 
(5) a survey of each mortgaged property; (6) an "approved 
attorney" letter from a title insurance company indemnifying the 
Bank against fraud or failure by the closing attorney to comply 
with the closing instructions; (7) state and county UCC searches 
regarding Bathgate and any entities in which Bathgate has 
assigned his interest or which own collateral; (8) copies of "all 
partnership agreements, charter documents and other 
organizational documents or agreements of entities in which . . . 
[Bathgate] has assigned interest or delivering or owning 
[c]ollateral in connection with the [l]oan"; (9) "[c]orporate 
resolutions adopted by the Board of Directors of Tuscol 
Development, Inc. and New Nas, Inc. - authorizing the issuance of 
applicable [c]ollateral documents in connection with the [l]oan"; 
(10) "[w]ritten consent of all partners of each partnership which 
grants or modifies a mortgage as collateral for the [l]oan or in 
connection with which the [b]orrower has granted a collateral 
assignment of his partnership interest, if required by the 
partnership agreement"; (11) affidavits with respect to 
environmental matters; (12) good standing certificates and 
corporate status searches with respect to Tuscol Development, 
Inc. and New Nas, Inc.; and (13) appraisals on the mortgaged 
property paid for by Bathgate.  See App. II at 603-05, 635-37, 
639-40.  
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the $187,500 note) and three notes payable on demand (the 
$4,000,000 note, the $250,000 note, and the $1,800,000 note). 
Bathgate defendants' App. I at 310. 
 On April 8, 1991, Bathgate failed to make a required 
payment on the $185,000 note.  In a letter dated May 1, 1991, the 
Bank formally demanded payment of the $185,000 note, and in a 
second letter dated May 1, 1991, the Bank formally demanded 
payment of the $1,800,000 note by Bathgate, NLA, and Landis. 
Bathgate failed to make the payments demanded on these six notes, 
and NLA and Landis failed to make the payments demanded of them 
on the $1,800,000 note. 
 
 B. Procedural History 
 On May 3, 1991, the Bank filed two suits in the 
Superior Court of New Jersey to collect the amounts outstanding 
under the six notes for which Bathgate had failed to make 
demanded payments:  (1) the $11,500,000 note; (2) the $187,500 
note; (3) the $4,000,000 note; (4) the $250,000 note; (5) the 
$185,000 note; and (6) the $1,800,000 note.  In one of the state 
court actions, the Bank sought judgment against Landis, NLA 
Associates Limited Partnership, LGP-I Limited Partnership, and 
LGP-I Capital Corporation (the Landis defendants), and against 
Bathgate, Novasau Associates, and New Nas, Inc. for the amount 
outstanding under the $1,800,000 note.  In the other state court 
action, the Bank sought judgment against Bathgate and Novasau 
Associates for the amounts outstanding under: (1) the $11,500,000 
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note; (2) the $187,500 note; (3) the $4,000,000 note; (4) the 
$250,000 note; and (5) the $185,000 note.   
 On May 22, 1991, the Bank was declared insolvent and 
the FDIC was appointed as the Bank's receiver.  The notes in 
question were sold to an acquiring bank, but then repurchased by 
the FDIC pursuant to a clause in the Purchase and Assumption 
Agreement authorizing the acquiring bank to "put" back to the 
FDIC any adversely classified loans. 
 In June 1991, Bathgate defaulted on the $2,000,000 note 
and in July 1991, he defaulted on the $1,620,000 note.  In a 
letter dated September 13, 1991, the FDIC informed Bathgate that 
he had defaulted on these notes and that it had accelerated the 
maturity of the notes and was demanding full payment of the 
principal, interest, and other sums outstanding.  Bathgate did 
not make these payments. 
 On June 20, 1991, the FDIC removed the state court 
actions to the district court, which consolidated them on 
November 8, 1991.  The FDIC was substituted for the Bank as 
plaintiff.  Subsequently, the FDIC filed an amended complaint 
adding T. Pamela Bathgate, 54 Buena Vista Associates, Tuscol 
Development, Inc., Old Monmouth Associates, Airport Associates, 
Gerald A. Gura, the Club at West Deptford, and the State of New 
Jersey as defendants. 
 In September 1992, the Bathgate defendants (Bathgate, 
Novasau Associates Limited Partnership, New Nas, Inc., 54 Buena 
Vista Associates, Tuscol Development, Inc., and Old Monmouth 
Associates) filed a third-party complaint against the Office of 
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the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), John McDougal, an OCC 
employee, and nine directors or officers of the Bank, William 
Barlow, John C. Fellows, Jr., Ebert L. Hall, Joseph P. Iaria, 
David E. Johnson, Jr., Irene F. Kramer, Jacqueline F. Pappas, 
John F. Russo, and Leonard G. Lomell.  The district court 
dismissed the third-party complaint by oral order on March 1, 
1993.  See Bathgate defendants' App. III at 1007-36 (transcript 
of proceedings).  The Bathgate defendants have not attempted to 
appeal from this order.  However, they did file a motion for 
leave to file an amended third-party complaint.  Subsequently, 
the Bathgate defendants voluntarily dismissed their third-party 
complaint against the OCC and McDougal, and the district court 
denied their motion for leave to amend the remaining third-party 
claims, holding that their proposed amendments would be futile. 
FDIC v. Bathgate et al., Civ. No. 91-2779 (consolidated), 
Memorandum and Order at 5 (D.N.J. July 19, 1993) (see Bathgate 
defendants' App. III at 1041).    
 The Bathgate defendants raised a number of defenses 
against the FDIC's claims including: (1) setoff and accord and 
satisfaction; (2) breach of condition; (3) failure to perform a 
condition precedent; (4) estoppel; (5) cancellation of debt; (6) 
failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted; (7) 
fraud; (8) laches; (9) payment; (10) prevention of performance; 
and (11) unclean hands.  FDIC v. Bathgate et al., Civ. No. 91-
2779 (consolidated), Memorandum and Order at 10 n.2 (D.N.J. Mar. 
18, 1993) (see Bathgate defendants' App. I at 27).  They also 
advanced the following counterclaims: (1) breach of contract, and 
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the duty of good faith and fair dealing; (2) violation of the New 
Jersey Consumer Fraud Act; (3) trade libel/slander of credit; (4) 
slander of title; (5) unlawful interference with prospective 
economic advantage; (6) malicious and egregious breach of 
contract; (7) abuse of process; and (8) fraud and negligent 
misrepresentation.  Id. at 10-11 n.2 (see Bathgate defendants' 
App. I at 27-28).   
 On March 18, 1993, the district court granted summary 
judgment in favor of the FDIC both on its claims against the 
Bathgate defendants and on the Bathgate defendants' claims 
against it.  FDIC v. Bathgate et al., Civ. No. 91-2779 
(consolidated), Memorandum and Order (D.N.J. Mar. 18, 1993) (see 
Bathgate defendants' App. I at 18-35).  The district court held 
that the D'Oench Duhme doctrine and 12 U.S.C. § 1823(e) barred 
the defenses raised by the Bathgate defendants because they were 
based on an alleged oral agreement to extend the April 1 closing 
date for the transactions contemplated in the Bank's February 
letter to Bathgate.  Id. at 12-17 (see Bathgate defendants' App. 
I at 29-34).  The district court also held that D'Oench Duhme and 
section 1823(e) barred the majority of the counterclaims raised 
by the Bathgate defendants.  Id. at 16-17 (see Bathgate 
defendants' App. I at 33-34).   
 With regard to the Bathgate defendants' claims that the 
default letters, legal complaints and certain statements to the 
media allegedly issued by the Bank constitute libel and slander, 
the district court held: (1) that the default letters did not 
contain false statements since the closing date in the February 
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letter had passed and thus Bathgate was actually in default; (2) 
that the Bank's legal complaints were privileged from slander and 
defamation actions; and (3) that the Bathgate defendants "failed 
to designate specific facts that raise a material issue for trial 
regarding . . . [the Bank's] alleged republishing of the default 
letters and complaints to the press."  Id. at 16 (see Bathgate 
defendants' App. I at 33).  Finally, with regard to the 
counterclaim for tortious interference, the district court held 
that the Bathgate defendants "failed to raise an adequate 
response to the FDIC's argument that the claim is barred under 
the D'Oench, Duhme doctrine and § 1823(e)."  Id.0   
  
                     
0The district court also granted summary judgment in favor of the 
FDIC against Airport Associates, but later vacated the order 
based on a settlement agreement between the FDIC and Airport 
Associates.  The court denied without prejudice the FDIC's motion 
for summary judgment against the Landis defendants based on a 
forbearance agreement between the FDIC and these defendants. FDIC 
v. Bathgate et al., Civ. No. 91-2779 (consolidated), Memorandum 
and Order at 17 (D.N.J. Mar. 18, 1993) (see Bathgate defendants' 
App. I at 34). 
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On May 10, 1993, the district court denied Bathgate's motion for reconsideration of its 
March 18, 1993 order.  FDIC v. Bathgate et al., Civ. No. 91-2779 (consolidated), 
Memorandum and Order (D.N.J. May 10, 1993) (see Bathgate defendants' App. I at 39-41).  
The Bathgate defendants then filed a notice of appeal from this order denying their motion 
for reconsideration.  This appeal (Bathgate I) was docketed at No. 93-5328.  Bathgate I 
was submitted to a panel of this court for possible dismissal on jurisdictional grounds on 
August 16, 1993. 
 Meanwhile, on August 5, 1993, the district court entered an order and final 
judgment of foreclosure, FDIC v. Bathgate et al., Civ. No. 91-2779 (consolidated), Order 
and Final Judgment of Foreclosure and on Contract in Favor of Plaintiff (D.N.J. Aug. 5, 
1993) (see third-party defendants' Supp. App. at 16-36), and on August 18, 1993, the 
Bathgate defendants filed a second appeal.  This second appeal (Bathgate II) was doc
at No. 93-5507.0 
 By order entered October 6, 1993, we dismissed Bathgate I (No. 93-5328) for lack 
of jurisdiction because the district court's order was not "final" as to all claims and 
all parties and the district court had not granted a Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b) certification.  
Subsequently, the district court granted Rule 54(b) certification, and on October 14, 
1993, the Bathgate defendants filed a motion for reconsideration of the order dismissing 
Bathgate I (No. 93-5328) and for consolidation of Bathgate I (No. 93-5328) with Bathgate 
II (No. 93-5507).  By order entered November 8, 1993, we granted the motion for 
reconsideration, reinstated Bathgate I, and consolidated Bathgate I and Bathgate II.  The 
briefs filed in Bathgate II (No. 93-5507) address all the issues raised in the Bathgate I 
briefs (No. 93-5328), as well as the district court's denial of the Bathgate defendants' 
                     
0The FDIC filed an appeal on September 19, 1993, from an order of the district court 
entered on July 19, 1993, granting a motion by Airport Associates to enforce a settlement.  
This appeal was docketed at No. 93-5572, but later was dismissed pursuant to Fed. R. App. 
P. 42(b) by order dated December 13, 1993. 
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motion for leave to amend their third-party complaint.  See Bathgate defendants' Br. at 6 
n.4.    
 Thus, in this consolidated appeal, the Bathgate defendants are challenging both 
the district court's order granting summary judgment to the FDIC, FDIC v. Bathgate et al.
Civ. No. 91-2779 (consolidated), Memorandum and Order (D.N.J. Mar. 18, 1993) (see Bathgate 
defendants' App. I at 18-35), and the district court's order denying their motion for 
leave to amend their third-party complaint, FDIC v. Bathgate et al., Civ. No. 91-2779 
(consolidated), Memorandum and Order at 5 (D.N.J. July 19, 1993) (see Bathgate defendants' 
App. III at 1044).  We rely primarily on the Bathgate II briefs, as they address both 
issues. 
    
II. DISCUSSION 
 The district court exercised subject matter jurisdiction over the FDIC's claims 
against the Bathgate defendants and the Bathgate defendants' claims against the FDIC 
pursuant to 12 U.S.C. § 1819(b).  Although the district court granted summary judgment in 
favor of the FDIC, both on its claims against the Bathgate defendants and Bathgate's 
claims against it, the court denied without prejudice the FDIC's motion for summary 
judgment against the Landis defendants based on a forbearance agreement between the FDIC 
and these defendants.  FDIC v. Bathgate et al., Civ. No. 91-2779 (consolidated), 
Memorandum and Order at 17 (D.N.J. Mar. 18, 1993) (see Bathgate defendants' App. I at 34).  
Thus, a jurisdictional issue was created, as the district court proceedings were not final 
as to all parties and issues. 
 However, the district court granted a certification under Rule 54(b) which 
provides in pertinent part: "When more than one claim for relief is presented in an 
action, . . . or when multiple parties are involved, the court may direct the entry of a 
final judgment as to one or more but fewer than all of the claims or parties only upon an 
express determination that there is no just reason for delay and upon an express direction 
15 
for the entry of judgment."  We exercise plenary review over a district court's 
determination that a judgment is final, and then determine whether a district court has 
abused its discretion in deciding that a judgment is "'ready for appeal.'"  Gerardi
Pelullo, 16 F.3d 1363, 1368 (3d Cir. 1994) (quoting Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. General 
Electric Co., 446 U.S. 1, 8, 100 S.Ct. 1460, 1465 (1980)).  In this case, the district 
court granted the Rule 54(b) certification after making the required finding "that there 
is no just reason for delay" and directing the entry of judgment.  We concur in the 
district court's determination that the judgment was final and "ready for appeal."  Thus, 
we have jurisdiction over the Bathgate defendants' appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
 We exercise plenary review over the district court's grant of summary judgment 
in favor of the FDIC.  See Petruzzi's IGA v. Darling-Delaware Co., 998 F.2d 1224, 1230 (3d 
Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S.Ct. 554 (1993); Wheeler by Wheeler v. Towanda Area School 
Dist., 950 F.2d 128, 129 (3d Cir. 1991); American Medical Imaging Corp. v. St. Paul Fire 
and Marine Ins. Co., 949 F.2d 690, 692 (3d Cir. 1991).  Thus, we apply the same standard 
applied by the district court.  Petruzzi's IGA, 998 F.2d at 1230.  This standard entitles 
a movant to summary judgment "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, 
and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no 
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment 
as a matter of law."  Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).   
 
                     
0
 We have held that "a claimant against a failed thrift [or other depository institution] 
must exhaust FIRREA's administrative remedies before commencing a judicial action." 
Properties, Inc. v. Colonial Sav. Bank, 947 F.2d 49, 63 (3d Cir. 1991) (citing 12 U.S.C. § 
1821(d)(13)(D)); see also FDIC v. Shain, Schaffer & Rafanello, 944 F.2d 129, 132 (3d Cir. 
1991) (Section 1821(d)(13)(D) "expressly withdrew jurisdiction from all courts over any 
claim to a failed bank's assets that are made outside the procedure set forth in section 
1821.").  In their responses to an inquiry by this court, both the Bathgate defendants and 
the FDIC stated that they complied fully with the the administrative procedures enumerated 
in the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act of 1989 ("FIRREA"), 12 
U.S.C. § 1821(d)(3)-(d)(13).  See Bathgate defendants' Response at 4-5; FDIC Response at 
6.  Thus, our jurisdiction over the Bathgate defendants' claims against the FDIC is not in 
question. 
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[T]he moving party has the initial burden of identifying the evidence 
that demonstrates the absence of a genuine issue of material fact, 
[but] the respondent (the "non-movant") must establish the existence 
of each element on which it bears the burden of proof. 
J.F. Feeser, Inc. v. Serv-A-Portion, Inc., 909 F.2d 1524, 1531 (3d Cir. 1990), cert. 
denied, 499 U.S. 921, 111 S.Ct. 1313 (1991) (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 
317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552 (1986)).  Moreover, "[w]here the movant has produced 
evidence in support of its motion for summary judgment, the nonmovant cannot rest on the 
allegations of pleadings and must do more than create some metaphysical doubt."  
Petruzzi's IGA, 998 F.2d at 1230.  Finally, in applying this standard, "all inferences 
must be drawn against the movant, . . . and in favor of the nonmovant."  Erie 
Telecommunications, Inc. v. City of Erie, 853 F.2d 1084, 1093 (3d Cir. 1988). 
 
 A. The FDIC's Claims Against Bathgate 
 The Bathgate defendants argue that there is a material dispute of fact regarding 
whether they were in "default" on the notes at issue.0  They contend that the district 
court erred in granting summary judgment to the FDIC because they provided the district 
court with evidence contradicting its finding that "'since the closing date in the 
February commitment had lapsed, the Bathgate Defendants were in default.'"  See Bathgate 
defendants' Br. at 16 (quoting at FDIC v. Bathgate et al., Civ. No. 91-2779 
(consolidated), Memorandum and Order at 16 (D.N.J. Mar. 18, 1993)).  They refer to the 
February letter the Bank issued to Bathgate as an agreement which "consolidated any past 
payments" which were due on the notes, see Bathgate defendants' Br. at 11, and argue that 
the Bank breached this agreement by failing to provide completed documents to Bathgate by 
April 1, 1991 "even though all required information was either in the Bank's possession or 
would have been provided to the Bank, if requested," id. at 16.  Thus, they argue that 
                     
0Bathgate individually was the principal obligor on the notes, but as a matter of 
convenience we sometimes refer to the Bathgate defendants collectively, inasmuch as they 
have asserted counterclaims and a third-party complaint.  Moreover, Novasau was one of the 
parties to the $1,800,000 "Agreement for Commercial Letter of Credit." 
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they were not in default as of April 1, 1991, and that "[a]ny failure subsequent to April 
1 to make payments on Bathgate's obligations resulted from the Bank's prior breach and the 
devastating affect [sic] this breach had on his ability to pay," id. at 12.  However, as 
we noted above, the district court held that the D'Oench Duhme doctrine and 12 U.S.C. § 
1823(e) barred the defenses raised by the Bathgate defendants in support of this theory.  
FDIC v. Bathgate et al., Civ. No. 91-2779 (consolidated), Memorandum and Order at 12
(D.N.J. Mar. 18, 1993) (see Bathgate defendants' App. I at 29-34). 
   
 1. Are the Bathgate defendants' defenses barred by                   the 
D'Oench Duhme Doctrine and section 1823(e)? 
   (a) Defense of Breach of Agreement 
 The Bathgate defendants argue that the FDIC is not entitled to recover under the 
notes and the guaranty acquired from the Bank because the Bank breached the agreement 
embodied in its February letter to Bathgate.  The district court held that D'Oench Duhme
and section 1823(e) barred the Bathgate defendants' defense of breach of agreement because 
the Bathgate defendants were "attempting to enforce an oral agreement to extend a closing 
date on a proposed loan restructuring."  FDIC v. Bathgate et al., Civ. No. 91-2779 
(consolidated), Memorandum and Order at 12 (D.N.J. Mar. 18, 1993) (see Bathgate 
defendants' App. I at 29). The Bathgate defendants state that "[c]ontrary to the Opinion 
[of the district court], the Bathgate Defendants are not attempting to enforce the Bank's 
oral extension of the Agreement. . . . Rather, the Bathgate Defendants are attempting to 
enforce the alleged written agreement which the Bank breached by not preparing closing 
documents and attending closing by the April 1, 1991 deadline" as required by the February 
letter.  See Bathgate defendants' Br. at 18-19 (citing FDIC v. Bathgate et al., Civ. No. 
91-2779 (consolidated), Memorandum and Order at 11 (D.N.J. Mar. 18, 1993) (emphasis in 
original)).  While they claim that the Bank orally extended the closing date for the 
transactions contemplated in the February letter, they contend that their argument does 
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not rest on this allegation.  Accordingly, they maintain that D'Oench Duhme does not bar 
their defense of breach of agreement since the February letter was neither oral nor 
secret.  Id. at 18-20.  
 In D'Oench, Duhme & Co. v. FDIC, 315 U.S. 447, 460-62, 62 S.Ct. 676, 680-
(1942), the Supreme Court held that in an action brought by the FDIC to collect on a note 
acquired from a bank, the debtor or maker of the note may not raise a secret agreement as 
a defense to the FDIC's enforcement of the note. The court based its holding on provisions 
of the Federal Reserve Act which "reveal[ed] a federal policy to protect [the FDIC] . . . 
and the public funds which it administers against misrepresentations as to the securities 
or other assets in the portfolios of the banks which [the FDIC] . . . insures or to which 
it makes loans."  Id. at 457, 62 S.Ct. at 679.  The Supreme Court reasoned that this 
policy barred any defense based on "a scheme or arrangement whereby the banking authority 
on which . . . [the FDIC] relied in insuring the bank was or was likely to be misled."  
Id. at 460, 62 S.Ct. at 681.  Thus, "[t]he rule emerging from D'Oench Duhme is that no 
agreement between a borrower and a bank which does not plainly appear on the face of an 
obligation or in the bank's official records is enforceable against the FDIC."  Adams
Madison Realty & Dev., Inc., 937 F.2d 845, 852 (3d Cir. 1991).  As we stated in Daddona
'[f]undamentally, D'Oench attempts to ensure that FDIC examiners can 
accurately assess the condition of a bank based on its books.  The 
doctrine means that government has no duty to compile oral histories 
of the bank's customers and loan officers.  Nor must the FDIC retain 
linguists and cryptologists to tease out the meaning of facially-
unencumbered notes.  Spreadsheet experts need not be joined by 
historians, soothsayers, and spiritualists in a Lewis Carroll-like 
search for a bank's unrecorded liabilities.' 
RTC v. Daddona, 9 F.3d 312, 319 (3d Cir. 1993) (quoting Bowen v. FDIC, 915 F.2d 1013, 1016 
(5th Cir. 1990)).  Based on the purpose of the doctrine, we have held that "not only does 
the existence of the agreement have to appear plainly on the face of an obligation, but 
the basic structure of that agreement - its essential terms - must also appear plainly on 
the face of that obligation."  Id. at 319.  
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 The holding in D'Oench Duhme "essentially" was codified by the Federal Deposit 
Insurance Act of 1950.  Id. at 316.  See also Carteret Sav. Bank, P.A. v. Compton, Luther 
& Sons, Inc., 899 F.2d 340, 343 (4th Cir. 1990).  The Act provides that: 
  No agreement which tends to diminish or defeat the interest of the 
[FDIC] in any asset acquired by it under this section or under section 
1821 of this title, either as security for a loan or by purchase or as 
receiver of any insured depository institution, shall be valid against 
the [FDIC] unless such agreement - 
  (1) is in writing, 
  (2) was executed by the depository institution and any 
person claiming an adverse interest thereunder, including 
the obligor, contemporaneously with the acquisition of the 
asset by the depository institution, 
  (3) was approved by the board of directors of the 
depository institution or its loan committee, which approval 
shall be reflected in the minutes of said board or 
committee, and 
  (4) has been, continuously, from the time of its 
execution, an official record of the depository institution. 
12 U.S.C. § 1823(e).  Congress intended section 1823(e) "to allow federal and state bank 
examiners to rely on a bank's records in evaluating the worth of the bank's assets," to 
"ensure mature consideration of unusual loan transactions by senior bank officials, and 
[to] prevent fraudulent insertion of new terms, with the collusion of bank employees, when 
a bank appears headed for failure."  Langley v. FDIC, 484 U.S. 86, 91-92, 108 S.Ct. 396, 
401 (1987).0   
 Clearly the district court was correct in holding that D'Oench Duhme and section 
1823(e) barred any defense based on the Bathgate defendants' contention that they reached 
an oral agreement with the Bank to extend the April 1 closing date identified in the 
February letter.  Thus, the real question is whether in light of the D'Oench Duhme 
doctrine and the requirements of section 1823(e), the alleged agreement embodied in the 
February letter can "diminish or defeat" the FDIC's rights under the promissory notes 
                     
0The protection of 12 U.S.C. § 1823(e) applies to the FDIC in both its corporate capacity 
and its capacity as receiver for failed institutions.  12 U.S.C. §§ 1821(d)(9)(A), 
1823(e).  See also Bowen v. FDIC, 915 F.2d 1013, 1015 n.3 (5th Cir. 1990); FDIC v. 
Hamilton, 939 F.2d 1225, 1230 n.6 (5th Cir. 1991). 
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acquired from the Bank.  The Bathgate defendants argue that the agreement embodied in the 
February letter can "diminish or defeat" the FDIC's rights under the promissory notes 
acquired from the Bank because it is in writing.  Their position that the contents of the 
February letter can diminish or defeat the FDIC's rights under facially unqualified 
promissory notes must rest on one of two constructions of the February letter.  One 
construction they seem to advance is that once Bathgate signed the Bank's February letter 
and returned it to the Bank in a timely fashion, the Bank's preparation of the documents 
required to close the proposed loan consolidating five of Bathgate's preexisting notes 
became a condition to the performance of the Bathgate defendants' obligations under these 
preexisting notes.  Alternatively, the Bathgate defendants' position must rest on the 
argument that once Bathgate signed the Bank's February letter and returned it to the Bank 
in a timely fashion, the letter obligated the Bank to close and execute the proposed loan.  
But neither of these arguments survives the D'Oench Duhme doctrine or section 1823(e) 
because the February letter does not create a genuine issue of material fact as to the 
existence of a written agreement providing (1) that the Bank's preparation of the 
documents required to close the proposed loan was a condition to the performance of the 
Bathgate defendants' obligations under the preexisting notes or (2) that the Bank was 
obligated to close and execute the proposed loan consolidating Bathgate's obligations 
under five of the preexisting notes. 
  The Supreme Court in Langley held that in light of section 1823(e)'s intended 
functions and of the broad language used in D'Oench Duhme, the term "agreement" in section 
1823(e) should be construed to cover not only a party's promises to perform acts, but also 
conditions to the performance of a party's obligations.  Langley, 484 U.S. at 90-93, 108 
S.Ct. at 401-02. Thus, the Act requires that both promises and conditions be in writing.  
Moreover, as we noted above, "the purpose of section 1823(e), and by implication the 
D'Oench, Duhme doctrine, is to allow the FDIC to rely on bank records both when insuring 
the bank and when taking over a failed bank."  FSLIC v. Two Rivers Assocs., Inc., 880 F.2d 
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1267, 1275 (11th Cir. 1989) (citing Langley, 484 U.S. at 91-92, 108 S.Ct. at 401).  Thus, 
the focus of our inquiry must be whether the February letter put the FDIC on notice: (1) 
that the Bank's preparation of the documents required to close the proposed loan was a 
condition to the performance of the Bathgate defendants' obligations under the preexisting 
notes or (2) that the Bank was obligated to close and execute the proposed loan 
consolidating Bathgate's obligations under five of the preexisting notes. 
 Although the February letter contains the Bank's written promise to prepare 
certain documents required to close the proposed loan, it does not contain any language 
suggesting that the performance of this promise is a condition to Bathgate's performance 
of his obligations on the preexisting notes.  Thus, it does not put the FDIC on notice 
that Bathgate's obligations under the otherwise unqualified preexisting notes were 
conditioned on the Bank's preparation of the documents required to close the proposed 
loan.  Indeed, we cannot conceive that the Bank would have entered into an agreement which 
would discharge many millions in loans if the subsequent loan was not closed. 
 Similarly, although the February letter expresses the Bank's intent to "modify 
and consolidate" five of Bathgate's preexisting notes, it does not obligate the Bank to do 
so.  See Bathgate defendants' App. II at 629.  The February letter stated that the Bank 
had "agreed to modify and consolidate" five of Bathgate's preexisting notes, id., and was 
signed by the Bank's Senior Vice President, William Carlough, id. at 642.  Moreover, after 
receiving the letter, Bathgate signed it and returned it to the Bank by February 26, 1991, 
as required by the terms of the letter.  Id. at 641-42.  However, the letter expressly 
stated that the Bank's "commitment shall expire and shall be of no further effect if the 
transactions contemplated by th[e] commitment are not closed by 4/1/91."  Id. at 641.  The 
Bank sent a draft agreement for the proposed loan to Bathgate on March 22, 1991, via 
Federal Express.  Id. at 649.  This draft agreement and the accompanying promissory note 
were incomplete and never were signed by Bathgate or a representative of the Bank.  
649-85.  Furthermore, the draft agreement explicitly stated that "[t]he Bank shall not be 
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obligated to make the Loan hereunder unless all legal matters incident to the transactions 
hereby contemplated shall be satisfactory to the Bank and its counsel, and it shall have 
received properly executed, as of the closing date, and in a form it deems satisfactory," 
the agreement, the attached promissory note, and other enumerated documents.  Id. at 661
64.   
 Since neither the draft loan agreement nor the attached promissory note was 
completed or signed, the proposed loan never was closed, and the February letter expired 
by its own terms on April 1, 1991.  It is clear that neither the February letter, nor the 
draft agreement and promissory note could have put the FDIC on notice:  (1) that the 
February letter made Bathgate's obligations under the otherwise unqualified preexisting 
notes conditional on the Bank's preparation of the documents required to close the 
proposed loan or (2) that once Bathgate signed the Bank's February letter and returned it
to the Bank in a timely fashion, the Bank was obligated to close and execute the proposed 
loan.  As the FDIC notes in its brief, "Bathgate's breach of contract claims and his 
defenses to his obligations primarily rest on three unrecorded conditions to otherwise 
facially unqualified instruments: (1) that the terms of the February Commitment Letter 
continued to bind the Bank after April 1, 1991, despite the Letter's express terms to the 
contrary; (2) that the Letter cured his October 1990 default on the 11,500,000 Note;" and 
(3) that the February commitment letter covered not only the five preexisting notes which 
the Bank proposed to consolidate, but also "the $185,000 Note, the $1,620,000 Note, and 
the $2,000,000 Note . . . despite the lack of a writing purporting to link these Notes to 
the Letter."  See FDIC Br. at 15. 
 Thus, we hold that D'Oench Duhme and section 1823(e) bar the Bathgate 
defendants' defense of breach of agreement.  Our holding is consistent with the holdings 
in RTC v. Daddona, 9 F.3d 312; FSLIC v. Two Rivers Assocs., Inc., 880 F.2d 1267; FSLIC
Gemini Management, 921 F.2d 241 (9th Cir. 1990); and FDIC v. O'Neil, 809 F.2d 350 (7th 
Cir. 1987).  
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 Daddona involved a suit brought by the RTC against real estate developers to 
recover on a $2,230,000 loan for the acquisition of an industrial park.  Daddona, 9 F.3d 
at 314-15. The RTC had acquired the loan from a savings and loan.  Id.  The defendant real 
estate developers claimed that the savings and loan had breached a written agreement to 
provide them an additional loan of at least $9,000,000 for improvement and development of 
the industrial park.  Id.  In support of their argument, the defendants pointed to 
"several writings that refer[red] to the $2,230,000 loan as an initial loan and refer[red] 
to purposes other than the acquisition of property." Id. at 316.  We held that "an 
agreement is only 'in writing' if its basic structure is apparent on the face of the 
writing," id. at 314, and concluded that the alleged agreement to extend an additional 
loan did not survive the requirements of D'Oench Duhme and section 1823(e) because the 
writings "provide[d] no terms of the alleged agreement whatsoever," id. at 317.  The 
"evidence establishe[d] no more than that the parties contemplated future loans, not 
they had agreed to them."  Id.   
 In this case, the February letter establishes that the Bank contemplated a 
future loan to Bathgate on certain terms. However, it is not "apparent on the face of the 
writing" that once Bathgate signed the Bank's February letter and returned it to the Bank 
in a timely fashion, the Bank's preparation of the documents required to close the 
proposed loan would become a condition to the performance of the Bathgate defendants' 
obligations under the preexisting notes, nor is it "apparent on the face of the writing" 
that once the Bank's February letter was signed by Bathgate and returned to the Bank in a 
timely fashion, the Bank would become obligated to close and execute the proposed loan 
consolidating Bathgate's obligations under five of the preexisting notes.  What is 
"apparent on the face of the writing" is that the commitment embodied in the February 
letter would expire on April 1, 1991, if the transactions contemplated in the letter were 
not closed by that time.  Thus, our holding in Daddona supports our conclusion that 
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D'Oench Duhme and section 1823(e) bar the Bathgate defendants' defense of breach of 
agreement.  
 Two Rivers Assocs. involved a suit by the FSLIC to recover on several notes 
acquired from a savings and loan and to foreclose on the mortgages securing these notes.  
Two Rivers Assocs., 880 F.2d at 1268-69.  The defendant in Two Rivers Assocs., like the 
defendant in Daddona, claimed that the savings and loan had breached an agreement to 
provide it with additional funds.  Id. at 1275.  According to the defendant, the savings 
and loan agreed to fund an entire development project, but refused to advance further 
funds after funding only part of the project. Id.  The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh 
Circuit held that the defendant was barred from asserting a defense based on the breach of 
an agreement to fund the entire development project because the written provisions in the 
loan agreements "at most reflect[ed] that [the savings and loan] . . . intended to loan 
additional funds, [and] . . . fell far short of establishing that [the savings and loan] . 
. . was obligated to fund the entire project."  Id. at 1276.  "At no point in the many 
different documents evidencing the loans at issue . . . [was] there an explicit accep
of the obligation to fund the entire project."  Id.  Thus, D'Oench Duhme barred the 
defendant's defense of breach of agreement because the FSLIC was not "put on notice of any 
agreement that . . . [the savings and loan] was obligated to fund the entire project."  
Id.0  Similarly, in this case, D'Oench Duhme bars the Bathgate defendants' defense of 
breach of agreement because the February letter did not put the FDIC on notice that once 
Bathgate signed the Bank's February letter and returned it to the Bank in a timely 
                     
0See also Mainland Sav. Ass'n v. Riverfront Assocs., Ltd., 872 F.2d 955, 956 (10th Cir.) 
(held that D'Oench Duhme barred obligor's defenses of intentional fraud, gross negligence, 
reckless conduct, breach of an agreement to fund, and breach of the implied covenant of 
contractual fair dealing because "[n]othing in the note, accompanying security agreements 
or other documents pertaining to the transaction evidences any type of conditional promise 
or side agreement [to fund a second loan] . . . of which the FSLIC might have been 
aware"), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 890, 110 S.Ct. 235 (1989); Beighley v. FDIC, 868 F.2d 776, 
784 (5th Cir. 1989) (held that D'Oench Duhme bars defenses arising from bank's alleged 
agreement to finance future loans because it is "not clearly evidenced in the bank's 
records, and would not be apparent to bank examiners"). 
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fashion, the Bank's preparation of the documents required to close the proposed loan would 
become a condition to the performance of the Bathgate defendants' obligations under the 
preexisting notes or that the Bank would become obligated to close and execute the 
proposed loan.  
 In FSLIC v. Gemini Management, 921 F.2d 241, the FSLIC sought to recover on a 
loan of $1,100,000 acquired from a savings and loan.  The defendant asserted affirmative 
defenses and counterclaims based on the savings and loan's alleged agreement to extend it 
a larger loan of $1,545,000.  Id. at 243-45.  In support of its claims, the defendant 
pointed to an initial commitment letter, stating that the savings and loan agreed to loan 
the defendant $1,545,000.  Id.  This initial commitment letter "was unsigned, was not 
evidenced by a promissory note, and therefore expired by its own terms on August 20, 
1984."  Id. at 245.  In contrast, a second commitment letter providing for a loan of 
$1,100,000 "was signed and supported by full loan documentation."  Id.   
 The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that "D'Oench and its progeny 
require a clear and explicit written obligation."  Thus, although D'Oench Duhme does not 
bar "'defenses based on a bilateral obligation which appears in the bank's records,'"  
(quoting Two Rivers, 880 F.2d at 1275) (emphasis added in Gemini Management), the court 
held that D'Oench Duhme barred the defenses and counterclaims based on the savings and 
loan's alleged agreement to extend a larger loan of $1,545,000.  The court based its 
holding on the conclusion that the initial commitment letter fell short of "establishing 
that . . . [the savings and loan] was obligated" to extend the larger loan, although it 
established the savings and loan's intent to do so.  921 F.2d at 245.  Gemini Management
is persuasive precedent because the February letter, like the initial commitment letter in 
Gemini Management, was not evidenced by a promissory note, and the draft loan agreement 
subsequently prepared by the Bank never was signed.  Thus, the February letter and the 
draft loan agreement fall short of establishing the type of written bilateral obligation 
required by Gemini Management to survive D'Oench Duhme. 
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 Finally, the decision by the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in 
O'Neil, 809 F.2d 350, also supports our holding.  The defendants in O'Neil borrowed 
$1,000,000 from a bank.  O'Neil, 809 F.2d at 352.  The FDIC subsequently purchased the 
defendants' $1,000,000 note, and then sought to collect on it.  Id.  The defendants 
claimed that when the bank extended the $1,000,000 loan, it and two other banks agreed to 
support the defendants' bid to purchase a bankrupt hospital.  Id.  According to the 
defendants, the banks breached this agreement by supporting a rival bidder, and the 
defendants were entitled to retain the $1,000,000 as a setoff to their damages against the 
banks.  Id.  The principal writing supporting the defendants' argument was a draft 
agreement which never had been executed, but which was referenced in the $1,000,000 
promissory note.  The Court of Appeals held that the unexecuted draft agreement did not 
satisfy the "demanding requirements of section 1823(e)" because it "was never executed by 
the parties to it, was not approved by the bank's board or loan committee, was not noted 
in the bank's minutes, and was not an official or for that matter any other sort of bank 
record."  Id. at 353-54.   
 In this case, although the Bank's Senior Credit and Policy Committee and the 
Bank's Executive Committee approved the "proposal" contained in the February letter, and 
their decisions were noted in their minutes, see Bathgate App. II at 646, 648, the letter 
was merely an offer which was contingent on a number of events and expired on April 1, 
1991.  By the terms of the offer, Bathgate could not transform the offer into an 
unconditional agreement merely by signing and returning it by February 26.  In fact, the 
Bank prepared a draft agreement and promissory note which, like the draft agreement in 
O'Neil, never were executed and therefore never became official bank records. Thus, we 
reiterate that in light of D'Oench Duhme and the requirements of section 1823(e), the 
February letter cannot support the Bathgate defendants' claims that once Bathgate signed 
the Bank's February letter and returned it to the Bank in a timely fashion, the Bank's 
preparation of the documents required to close the proposed loan became a condition to the 
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performance of the Bathgate defendants' obligations under the preexisting notes.  
Furthermore, the February letter cannot support the Bathgate defendants' claim that the 
Bank became obligated to close and execute the proposed loan consolidating Bathgate's 
obligations under five of the preexisting notes.   
 Moreover, it is questionable whether any agreement reflected in the February 
letter would satisfy the contemporaneity requirement of section 1823(e), since the Bank 
issued the February letter after Bathgate executed the notes involved in this case.  
12 U.S.C. § 1823(e)(2); FDIC v. Virginia Crossings Partnership, 909 F.2d 306, 309 (8th 
Cir. 1990) (held that memoranda prepared many months before execution of loans did not 
satisfy section 1823(e)'s contemporaneity requirement); FDIC v. Manatt, 922 F.2d 486, 489 
(8th Cir.) (concurring opinion) ("I concur with the result the court reaches and write 
separately only to express my view that the district court did not err in holding that the 
contemporaneous requirement of 12 U.S.C. § 1823(e)(2) was not met, and that Manatt has not 
established accord and satisfaction as an affirmative defense."), cert. denied, 111 S.Ct. 
2889 (1991); Carteret Sav. Bank, P.A. v. Compton, Luther & Sons, 899 F.2d at 344 ("Title 
12 U.S.C.A. §1823 clearly requires that the collateral agreement must be contemporane
[with the execution of a note] if it is to be enforceable.").  But see Resolution Trust 
Corp. v.  Midwest Fed. Sav. Bank, 4 F.3d 1490, 1500-01 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding that loan 
commitment letter executed more than two months prior to the final loan documents 
satisfied contemporaneity requirement of section 1823(e)(2) because "it takes several 
months to put together" large loans and satisfaction of the requirement "should be 
considered in light of commercial reality."); FDIC v. Manatt, 922 F.2d at 489 n.4 ("We 
doubt that Congress intended that section 1823(e)(2)'s contemporaneousness requirement 
would defeat a valid accord and satisfaction entered into by a bank.  Valid accord and 
satisfaction agreements are never contemporaneously executed with the initial documents 
incurring the debt - the idea that they would be so executed is simply contrary to general 
business practice and to common sense.  Surely Congress did not mean to preclude banks 
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from getting something of value by an accord and satisfaction rather than nothing at 
all.").  However, since we hold that the conditions on which the Bathgate defendants rely 
were not part of the February letter and thus were not in writing as required by 12 U.S.C. 
§ 1823(e)(1), we need not reach a definitive conclusion as to the applicability of the 
contemporaneity requirement of 12 U.S.C. § 1823(e)(2) in this case. 
 In support of their argument that the February letter satisfies the requirements 
of D'Oench Duhme and section 1823(e), the Bathgate defendants cite Agri Export Co-op
Universal Sav. Ass'n, 767 F. Supp. 824, 832 (S.D. Tex. 1991), and other cases holding that 
D'Oench Duhme and section 1823(e) do not bar certain defenses.  However, these cases are 
distinguishable. 
 In Agri Export Co-op, the plaintiffs sought to enforce a letter of credit issued 
by a savings association.  Agri Export Co-op, 767 F. Supp. at 826-27.  As receiver for the 
savings association, the RTC denied liability on the letter of credit, arguing that 
D'Oench Duhme and section 1823(e) barred recovery by the plaintiffs since the savings 
association's directors did not approve the letter of credit and it was not recorded 
properly in the savings association's records.  Id. at 827.  The court held that the 
D'Oench Duhme doctrine did not apply to the letter of credit because it was a "straight
forward obligation of the bank," not a "side agreement . . . inextricably entwined with a 
loan or other asset of the financial institution" or an agreement "intended to deceive, . 
. . [or] likely to deceive banking authorities."  Id. at 832.  Moreover, the court held 
that "[e]ven if the D'Oench doctrine could somehow be applicable to a letter of credit 
issued by a failed savings institution and its execution could somehow be characterized as 
a 'secret' or 'side' agreement, the 'completely innocent' exception to D'Oench articulated 
in Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Meo, 505 F.2d 790, 793 (9th Cir. 1974) would be 
appropriate in this case . . . [because] [o]ne would hardly expect a bank customer to do 
more than the . . . [plaintiff] did to assure that the letter of credit issued by 
Universal was valid."  Id.   
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 This case is distinguishable from Agri Export Co-op on multiple grounds.  First, 
the February letter is a "side agreement . . . inextricably entwined" with preexisting 
Bank assets.  Moreover, although the February letter may not have been intended to deceive 
banking authorities, because the letter had expired and the proposed loan consolidating 
certain preexisting notes never had been closed, the letter would not have put banking 
authorities on notice that any of Bathgate's preexisting notes were no longer enforceable 
as written.  Even if we were to recognize a "completely innocent" exception to D'Oench 
Duhme, Bathgate would not fall under it.  Bathgate could have done more to assure that the 
February letter or other writings clearly indicated that once he signed and timely 
returned the Bank's February letter, the Bank's preparation of the documents required to 
close the proposed loan became a condition to the performance of his obligations under the 
preexisting notes (in the unlikely circumstance that this was the parties' understanding) 
or, alternatively, that the Bank became obligated to close and execute the proposed loan 
consolidating his obligations under five of the preexisting notes.  At a minimum, he could 
have delivered to the Bank the documents which the February letter required him to supply 
and which clearly could not be prepared by Bank counsel.  See footnote 2, supra.  As the 
court in FDIC v. Hamilton, 939 F.2d 1225, 1230 (5th Cir. 1991), stated, one "justification 
for applying D'Oench, Duhme to oral agreements or collateral writings is that the obligor 
as party to the transaction is in a better position to protect himself than the FDIC."  
See also FDIC v. First Nat'l Fin. Co., 587 F.2d 1009, 1012 (9th Cir. 1978) (holding that 
Meo is distinguishable because in Meo, "[t]here was simply a failure of consideration of 
which the promisor was unaware until after the bank was closed and the suit was filed by 
the FDIC," whereas in this case there was no failure of consideration). 
 The Agri Export Co-op court also held that section 1823(e) did not apply to the 
letter of credit because the savings association did not "acquire a particular, 
identifiable asset" in exchange for the letter of credit, and therefore the RTC had "no 
'right, title or interest' in an asset that claims and defenses could 'diminish or 
30 
defeat'."  767 F. Supp. at 833-34.  Thus, this case is also distinguishable from Agri 
Export Co-op because the FDIC has an interest in the preexisting notes on which the 
Bathgate defendants defaulted, and the Bathgate defendants' claims and defenses, if 
successful, would "diminish or defeat" the FDIC's interest in these assets. 
 Other cases cited by the Bathgate defendants are also distinguishable.  For 
example, in Howell v. Continental Credit Corp., 655 F.2d 743, 744-745 (7th Cir. 1981), the 
FDIC sought to enforce leases which it had acquired from an insolvent bank.  The leases 
provided that a lessor which assigned its rights to the bank would lease certain equipment 
to a corporation.  Id.  The corporation claimed that the leases were invalid because the 
lessor never had purchased the required equipment, but the district court held that the 
corporation's claim was barred by D'Oench Duhme and section 1823(e).  The Court of Appeals 
for the Seventh Circuit reversed, holding that D'Oench Duhme and section 1823(e) were 
inapplicable because the leases that the FDIC sought to enforce "facially manifest[ed] 
bilateral obligations and serve[d] as the basis of the lessee's defense."  As the Howell
court stated,  
'when . . . the asset upon which the FDIC is attempting to recover is 
the very same agreement that the makers allege has been breached by 
the FDIC's assignors, . . . [n]one of the policies that favor the 
invocation of . . . [§ 1823(e)] are present . . . because the terms of 
the agreement that tend to diminish the rights of the FDIC appear in 
writing on the face of the agreement that the FDIC seeks to enforce.' 
 
655 F.2d at 747 (quoting Riverside Park Realty Co. v. FDIC, 465 F. Supp. 305, 313 (M.D. 
Tenn. 1978)).  Like the court in Howell, the court in FDIC v. Laguarta, 939 F.2d 1231, 
1238-39 (5th Cir. 1991), held that D'Oench Duhme does not bar an affirmative defense based
on "funding obligations . . . spelled out" in the loan agreement underlying the note which 
the FDIC is seeking to enforce.   See also FDIC v. Merchants Nat'l Bank of Mobile, 725 
F.2d 634, 639 (11th Cir.) ("Section 1823(e) does not apply . . . when the court determines 
if an asset is invalid . . . for breach of bilateral obligations contained in the asset. . 
. .  In such cases the parties contend that no asset exists or an asset is invalid and 
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that such invalidity is caused by acts independent of any understanding or side 
agreement.") (citations omitted), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 829, 105 S.Ct. 114 (1984).  
 In this case, however, the FDIC is attempting to enforce facially valid 
promissory notes which impose unilateral obligations on Bathgate to pay certain sums to 
the Bank, and neither these notes nor the loan agreements supporting them are the basis of 
the Bathgate defendants' defense of breach of agreement.  Instead, their defense is based 
on a separate document, the February letter, which they claim is a separate agreement.  
The court in O'Neil distinguished Howell on this basis, stating that it was "hard to 
quarrel" with the result in Howell because it involved a lease not a promissory note, the 
lease "was explicit about the lessor's obligation," and "there was no side agreement."  
O'Neil, 809 F.2d at 354.0  Thus, this case is distinguishable from Agri Export Co-op
Howell, and other cases holding that defenses based on writings containing bilateral 
obligations are not barred by D'Oench Duhme or section 1823(e). 
 We will affirm the district court's holding that D'Oench Duhme and section 
1823(e) bar the Bathgate defendants' defense of breach of agreement.  The district court 
also held that the Bathgate defendants' claim that the February letter constituted an
accord and satisfaction was barred because "the transactions contemplated in the February 
Commitment did not close before April 1, 1991, and there is no evidence of an agreement 
which satisfies § 1823(e) and extends the closing date."  FDIC v. Bathgate et al., Civ. 
No. 91-2779 (consolidated), Memorandum and Order at 15 (D.N.J. Mar. 18, 1993) (see 
                     
0See also FDIC v. Hamilton, 939 F.2d at 1231 (recognizing Howell exception to D'Oench 
Duhme, but holding that obligors could not avail themselves of it because the note upon 
which their claim was based did not "facially manifest" the bank's "bilateral obligation 
to fund timely the line of credit," the obligation which the obligors claimed the bank had 
failed to satisfy); Bell & Murphy & Assocs., Inc. v. Interfirst Bank Gateway, N.A., 894 
F.2d 750, 754 (5th Cir.) (holding that the Howell exception to D'Oench Duhme is only 
applicable if the bank's obligation appears on the face of the document the FDIC is 
seeking to enforce and the document is properly recorded in the bank's records), cert
denied, 498 U.S. 895, 111 S.Ct. 244 (1990). 
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Bathgate defendants' App. I at 32).  Based on the forgoing analysis, we also will affirm 
this holding.    
  (b)  Defenses of breach of the duty of good faith,            wrongful 
acceleration, and other defenses                         sounding in tort 
 The Bathgate defendants raised a number of defenses "which sound in tort, 
including breach of the duty of good faith; violation of the Consumer Fraud Act, [N.J. 
Stat. Ann. § 56:8-1 (West 1989)] et seq.; trade libel/slander of credit; slander of title; 
unlawful interference with prospective economic advantage; and malicious and egregious 
breach of the Bank's duty to protect the Collateral pledged to secure the Bathgate Loans."  
See Bathgate defendants' Br. at 20 n.11.   
 The district court held that the D'Oench Duhme doctrine and section 1823(e) 
barred the defenses of the duty of good faith and wrongful acceleration, because they 
could not be separated from the Bathgate defendants' allegations that the Bank breached an 
oral agreement since "[a]bsent the alleged oral agreement, . . . [the Bank] was entitled 
to demand payment on the overdue loans."  FDIC v. Bathgate et al., Civ. No. 91-2779 
(consolidated), Memorandum and Order at 13 (D.N.J. Mar. 18, 1993) (see Bathgate 
defendants' App. I at 30).  The district court also refused to consider the defense of 
impairment of collateral and other defenses based on the FDIC's tortious conduct because 
they were "similarly predicated on the alleged oral agreement."  Id. at 14 (see Bathgate 
defendants' App. I at 31).   
 As the FDIC points out in its brief, see FDIC Br. at 24 n.15, D'Oench Duhme
a defense or claim sounding in tort when the alleged tort arises from an unrecorded 
agreement.  See, e.g., In re Columbus Ave. Realty Trust, 968 F.2d 1332, 1344-45 (1st Cir. 
1992); Oliver v. RTC, 955 F.2d 583, 586 (8th Cir. 1992); Timberland Design, Inc. v.
Serv. Bank for Sav., 932 F.2d 46, 50 (1st Cir. 1991).  The Bathgate defendants claim that 
D'Oench Duhme does not bar the defense of the duty of good faith, the defense of wrongful 
acceleration, or other defenses based on the Bank's allegedly tortious conduct because 
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"[c]ontrary to the Opinion [of the district court], these claims are not 'inextricably 
linked to the alleged oral agreement.'"  see Bathgate defendants' Br. at 20 (quoting 
v. Bathgate et al., Civ. No. 91-2779 (consolidated), Memorandum and Order at 13 (D.N.J. 
Mar. 18, 1993)).  We disagree with the Bathgate defendants' position, and thus conclude 
that the Bathgate defendants are barred from raising the defenses of the duty of good 
faith, wrongful acceleration, and impairment of collateral, as well as other defenses 
based on the Bank's tortious conduct.   
 In support of their argument that the wrongful acceleration and breach of the 
duty of good faith defenses are not barred, the Bathgate defendants cite Texas 
Refrigeration Supply, Inc. v. FDIC, 953 F.2d 975 (5th Cir. 1992).  See Bathgate 
defendants' Br. at 21, 29.  The court in Texas Refrigeration held that the district court 
erred in granting summary judgment against the obligors on their claim of wrongful 
acceleration because there were genuine issues of material fact regarding whether the note 
had been accelerated and if so, whether it was accelerated in bad faith.  Id. at 981
However, the court noted that the obligor's claim of wrongful acceleration would be 
"ineffective against the FDIC" if it was based on an oral agreement providing that the 
lender would not accelerate the obligor's note.  Id. at 982 n.13.   
 In this case, the Bank informed Bathgate by a letter dated April 11, 1991, that 
he was in default under two notes, the $11,500,000 note and the $187,500 note, and that as 
a result, the Bank was accelerating the maturity on these notes.  See Bathgate defendants' 
App. I at 309-10.  At the same time, the Bank demanded payment on three notes which were 
payable "on demand," the $4,000,000 note, the $250,000 note, and the $1,800,000 note. 
at 310.  Subsequently, the Bank demanded payment on the $185,000 note which already had 
matured, id. at 315-16, and accelerated the maturity of two additional notes on which 
Bathgate defaulted in the summer of 1991, the $2,000,000 note and the $1,620,000 note.  
 The Bathgate defendants point to the minutes of the April 10, 1991 meeting of 
the Bank's Board of Directors as evidence of the Bank's bad faith.  See Bathgate 
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defendants' App. II at 734-37.  However, even drawing all inferences in favor of the 
Bathgate defendants, we conclude that the minutes of the Board meeting fail to establish a 
genuine issue of material fact regarding whether the Bank's decision to accelerate 
Bathgate's obligations was made in good faith.  Thus, having held that D'Oench Duhme
defenses based on any of the following: (1) an alleged oral agreement extending the April 
deadline in the February letter; (2) the claim that the Bank's preparation of the closing 
documents for the loan proposed in the February letter became a condition to the 
performance of Bathgate's obligations under the preexisting notes; or (3) the claim that 
the Bank became obligated to close the loan proposed in the February letter, we conclude 
that there is no genuine issue of material fact regarding whether the Bank's decision to 
accelerate Bathgate's obligations was made in good faith. 
 In support of their claim that the defense of impairment of collateral is not 
barred, the Bathgate defendants cite FDIC v. Blue Rock Shopping Center, Inc., 766 F.2d 744 
(3d Cir. 1985).  See Bathgate defendants' Br. at 23, 30.  In Blue Rock, we held that "a 
co-maker who signs a note to accommodate the primary obligor and who has the right of 
recourse against the primary obligor is a surety who can assert the defense [of 
unjustifiable impairment of collateral]" codified in section 3-606(1) of the Uniform 
Commercial Code.  Blue Rock, 766 F.2d at 749.  We also noted that although D'Oench Duhme
and section 1823(e) would not bar the introduction of an oral agreement between a 
principal and a surety regarding the surety's right of recourse, they would bar reliance 
on "agreements between a bank and its obligor showing or attempting to show that the 
obligation was illusory or conditional."  Id. at 754.   
 In this case, the Bathgate defendants' defense of unjustifiable impairment of 
collateral depends on their assertion that the February letter creates a genuine issue of 
material fact as to whether the Bathgate defendants were in default.  See Bathgate 
defendants' Br. at 24.  Thus, having rejected this assertion because D'Oench Duhme bars 
defenses based on the claims: (1) that the February letter made the Bank's preparation of 
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the closing documents for the proposed loan a condition to the performance of Bathgate's 
obligations under the preexisting notes; and (2) that the February letter obligated the 
Bank to close the loan proposed, we conclude that the Bathgate defendants' defense of 
impairment of collateral also is barred.        
 B. Bathgate's Claims Against The FDIC 
  1. Breach of contract 
 Like the Bathgate defendants' defense of breach of contract, D'Oench Duhme
section 1823(e) bar the Bathgate defendants' claims that the Bank breached an oral 
agreement to extend the April 1 deadline for closing the consolidated loan proposed in the 
February letter or that the Bank breached the terms of the February letter by failing to 
prepare and provide the documents required to close the loan.  We base this conclusion on 
the fact that neither claim is supported by a written document manifesting bilateral 
obligations, and that the February letter states that the Bank's commitment to refinance 
five of Bathgate's notes expires on April 1.   
 Moreover, as the FDIC points out, Bathgate has not rebutted specifically the 
FDIC's evidence that he failed to provide a substantial portion of the documents required 
by the February letter.  See FDIC Br. at 29 & n.18 (citing to the record before the 
district court).  The February letter identifies specific documents Bathgate was to 
furnish Bank counsel prior to the closing of the transactions contemplated by the letter, 
see Bathgate defendants' App. II at 635-37 (see also Bathgate defendants' App. II at 603
05), 639-40,0 and states that Bathgate must provide "[s]uch other information, documents, 
certificates, financial statements or opinions reasonably required by the Bank and its 
counsel," id. at 637.0  The fact that "all required information was either in the Bank's 
                     
0We already have set forth these items at note 2, supra. 
0The February letter also states that "[t]his transaction will be closed on the Bank's 
determination, in its sole discretion, that there has been no material adverse change to 
the financial operations and condition of the Borrower from the time of application and 
that no event has occurred or information has become known that makes the Bank deem itself 
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possession or would have been provided to the Bank, if requested[,]" see Bathgate 
defendants' Br. at 13 (emphasis added), is immaterial since the February letter does not 
indicate that the Bank was obligated to request information which the February letter 
required Bathgate to provide.  Surely if Bathgate wanted the Bank to close on the loan as 
contemplated by the February letter, he should have delivered the documents he was obliged 
to supply to the Bank.  As he does not claim that he did so, the Bathgate defendants' 
breach of contract claims are barred even without regard for D'Oench Duhme and section 
1823(e).  As we noted above, "[w]here the movant has produced evidence in support of its 
motion for summary judgment, the nonmovant cannot rest on the allegations of pleadings and 
must do more than create some metaphysical doubt."  Petruzzi's IGA, 998 F.2d at 1230.  
Thus, even if the Bathgate defendants' claim of breach of agreement were not barred, the 
FDIC would be entitled to summary judgment. 
   
  2. Trade Libel/Slander of Credit/Slander of                          
Title 
 With regard to the Bathgate defendants' claims that the default letters, legal 
complaints and alleged statements to the media issued by the Bank constitute trade libel, 
slander of credit, and slander of title, the district court reached the following 
conclusions: (1) the default letters did not contain false statements since the closing 
date in the February letter had passed and thus Bathgate was actually in default; (2) the 
Bank's legal complaints were privileged from slander and defamation actions; and (3) the 
Bathgate defendants "failed to designate specific facts that raise a material issue for 
trial regarding . . . [the Bank's] alleged republishing of the default letters and 
complaints to the press."  FDIC v. Bathgate et al., Civ. No. 91-2779 (consolidated), 
Memorandum and Order at 16 (D.N.J. Mar. 18, 1993) (see Bathgate defendants' App. I at 33). 
                                                                                          
insecure in this transaction."  See Bathgate defendants' App. II at 641.  However, neither 
party grounds its argument on this provision. 
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Based on these findings, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of the FDIC 
on the Bathgate defendants' claims of libel and slander.0 
   The torts of trade libel, slander of credit, and slander of title require "the 
publication, or communication to a third person, of false statements concerning the 
plaintiff, his property, or his business."  Henry V. Vacaro Const. Co. v. A.J. DePace, 
Inc., 349 A.2d 570, 572 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1975); see also Wendy's of South Jersey, 
Inc. v. Blanchard Management Corp., 406 A.2d 1337, 1338 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1979).  
The Bathgate defendants maintain that they sufficiently have stated claims for trade 
libel, slander of credit, and slander of title to withstand summary judgment because the 
Bank and Bank officers published and communicated to third parties that Bathgate was in 
default.  See Bathgate defendants' Br. at 31-33.  According to the Bathgate defendants, 
the district court's conclusion that the Bathgate defendants were in default as of April 
1, 1991, required it to engage in improper weighing of the evidence presented by the FDIC 
and the Bathgate defendants on this issue.  Id. at 32. We disagree.   
 As the Bathgate defendants' defenses based on the February letter are barred, we 
must regard the Bathgate defendants as having been in default as of April 1, 1991.  In any 
event, even if the defenses were not barred, the statement that the Bathgate defendants 
were in default was accurate with respect to the preexisting notes, for the existence of 
defenses to an action predicated on defaults merely excuses a defendant's failure to make 
a payment, but the defenses do not constitute payment.  Thus, there is no genuine issue of 
material fact regarding the veracity of statements by the Bank and its loan officers 
asserting that Bathgate was in default.   
                     
0We apply New Jersey substantive law to the Bathgate defendants' counterclaims for trade 
libel, slander of credit, slander of title, and unlawful interference with prospective 
economic advantage because both the FDIC and the Bathgate defendants briefed the claims 
under New Jersey law, and no party asserts that federal law or the law of another state is 
applicable. 
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 Moreover, as the district court held, allegations made in pleadings filed in an 
action are privileged as long as they have some relation to the action.  Wendy's of So
Jersey, Inc. v. Blanchard Management Corp., 406 A.2d at 1338-39.  There is no doubt that 
statements that Bathgate was in default on certain notes were related to the action to 
collect on those notes. Thus, we will affirm the district court's order for summary 
judgment in favor of the FDIC on the Bathgate defendants' counterclaims for libel, slander 
of credit, and slander of title. 
   
 3. Unlawful Interference with Prospective Economic                   Advantage
 With regard to the counterclaim for tortious interference, the district court 
held that the Bathgate defendants "failed to raise an adequate response to the FDIC's 
argument that the claim is barred under the D'Oench, Duhme doctrine and § 1823(e)."  
v. Bathgate et al., Civ. No. 91-2779 (consolidated), Memorandum and Order at 16 (D.N.J. 
Mar. 18, 1993) (see Bathgate defendants' App. I at 33). 
 "Under New Jersey law the five elements of a claim of tortious interference with 
a prospective or existing economic relationship are: (1) a plaintiff's existing or 
reasonable expectation of economic benefit or advantage; (2) the defendant's knowledge of 
that expectancy; (3) the defendant's wrongful, intentional interference with that 
expectancy; (4) the reasonable probability that the plaintiff would have received the 
anticipated economic benefit in the absence of interference; and (5) damages resulting 
from the defendant's interference." Lightning Lube, Inc. v. Witco Corp., 4 F.3d 1153, 1167 
(3d Cir. 1993) (citing Fineman v. Armstrong World Indus., Inc., 980 F.2d 171, 186 (3d Cir. 
1992), cert. denied, 113 S.Ct. 1285 (1993); Printing Mart-Morristown v. Sharp Elecs. 
Corp., 563 A.2d 31, 37 (N.J. 1989)).  The Bathgate defendants allege that Bathgate "had a 
reasonable expectation of selling his Collateral at full market prices," and that the Bank 
"intentionally and maliciously interfered by publishing false information through the 
Default Letters and statements to the media."  See Bathgate defendants' Br. at 33-34.  As 
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we have concluded that the Bathgate defendants have not created a genuine issue of 
material fact regarding the veracity of statements that Bathgate was in default, we hold 
that the Bathgate defendants failed to state a claim for unlawful interference with 
prospective economic advantage.  Moreover, Bathgate's expectation of selling his 
collateral at full market prices was based on the alleged agreement contained in the 
February letter which, if implemented, would have at least delayed the Bank's recourse to 
the collateral and, inasmuch as that agreement is not enforceable, his claim of unlawful 
interference with prospective economic advantage also is barred by D'Oench Duhme and 
section 1823(e).  See Bathgate defendants' Br. at 9 (stating that the February letter 
"provided that the Commercial Notes would be repaid by Bathgate's execution of a new note 
and pledge of additional collateral. . . .  In return, Bathgate was to repay the loans by 
personally selling collateral, such as real estate and partnership interests, pledged as 
security for the loans (the "Collateral"), over time, in order to achieve the greatest 
payment to the Bank, to protect Bathgate's equity in the Collateral, and to avoid 
publicity which would cause distress prices.").   
  
  4. Could the Bathgate defendants set off their                        
alleged damages against their obligations                         under the notes and the 
guaranty?  
 The FDIC argues that even if D'Oench Duhme and section 1823(e) did not bar 
Bathgate's counterclaims or "Bathgate otherwise . . . established a genuine issue of 
material fact, neither circumstance would bar the FDIC-Receiver from obtaining judgment 
against Bathgate or from foreclosing on the collateral . . . [because] Bathgate must first 
obtain judgment on his unliquidated claims and then seek satisfaction of the judgment as a 
creditor of the failed institution, thereby entitling him to no more than a ratable 
distribution of the assets of the failed institution."  See FDIC Br. at 34 (citing 
Beighley, 868 F.2d at 784 n.12).  In light of our holdings regarding Bathgate's 
counterclaims, we need not reach this issue. 
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 C. The Motion For Leave To Amend the Third-Party                     Claims
 On September 3, 1992, the Bathgate defendants filed a third-party complaint 
against the individual directors and officers of the Bank (the "Bank directors") pursuant 
to Fed. R. Civ. P. 14(a), which the district court dismissed by oral order on March 1, 
1993.  See Bathgate defendants' App. III at 1007-36 (transcript of proceedings).  While 
the Bathgate defendants have not attempted to appeal from this order, they did file a 
motion for leave to file an amended third-party complaint.  The district court denied that 
motion, holding that their proposed amendments would be futile.  FDIC v. Bathgate et al.
Civ. No. 91-2779 (consolidated), Memorandum and Order at 5 (D.N.J. July 19, 1993) (
Bathgate defendants' App. III at 1041). 
 The Bank directors argue that we lack subject matter jurisdiction over the 
Bathgate defendants' third-party complaint because it is prohibited by Rules 14(a) and 
13(h).  See Bank directors' Br. at 25-28.  In its March 1, 1993 order dismissing the 
third-party complaint, the district court cited 28 U.S.C. §1367 as the basis for subject 
matter jurisdiction over the third-party complaint, and stated that "[a]lthough it appears 
that the Directors are more properly aligned as counterclaim-defendants [pursuant to Rule 
13(h)], [than as third-party defendants pursuant to Rule 14(a),] the Court is not 
persuaded that Bathgate's claims should be dismissed on this ground."  See Bathgate 
defendants' App. III at 1028.   
 Rule 14(a) provides in pertinent part that "a defending party, as a third
plaintiff, may cause a summons and complaint to be served upon a person not a party to the 
action who is or may be liable to the third-party plaintiff for all or part of the 
plaintiff's claim against the third-party plaintiff." A third-party claim may be asserted 
under Rule 14(a) only when the third party's liability is in some way dependent on the 
outcome of the main claim or when the third party is secondarily liable to defendant.  If 
the claim is separate or independent from the main action, impleader will be denied.
C.A. Wright, A. Miller, M. K. Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure, Vol. 6, § 1446, at 
355-58 (1990).  Thus, we conclude that the Bathgate defendants' pleading against the Bank 
directors does not qualify as a third-party complaint under Rule 14(a), because the Bank 
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directors' liability is not derivative of the Bathgate defendants' liability on the notes 
for which the FDIC is seeking payment.     
 The Bank directors also maintain that joinder of the Bathgate defendants' claims 
against them was prohibited by Rule 13(h).0  Rule 13(h) provides that "persons other than 
                     
0Although Judge Cowen concurs in the judgment dismissing the third-party complaint against 
the directors, he would not dismiss it on the merits.  He would dismiss it for the reasons 
stated in this footnote and without prejudice to any state law causes of action that the 
Bathgate defendants may bring against the directors in New Jersey state courts where the 
claims belong. 
 
 Although Rule 13(h), together with Rules 19 and 20, appears to give the district 
court broad power to join additional parties, the better understanding is that, as quoted 
in Judge Greenberg's opinion, "Rule 13(h) only authorizes the court to join additional 
persons in order to adjudicate a counterclaim or cross-claim that already is before the 
court or one that is being asserted at the same time the addition of a nonparty is sought. 
This means that a counterclaim or cross-claim may not be directed solely against persons 
who are not already parties to the original action, but must involve at least one existing 
party." 6 Wright, Miller & Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1435, at 270-71.  The 
"in order to adjudicate counterclaims" language underscores that the presence of 
additional parties is either necessary or close to necessary to the resolution of the 
counterclaims.  The claims alleged in the third-party complaint are not "counterclaims" or 
"cross-claims" as required under Rule 13(h).  Nor are the defendant directors necessary 
parties "in order to adjudicate [the] counterclaims" that the Bathgate defendants asserted 
against the Bank.   
 
 Moreover, 28 U.S.C. § 1367 may not cover the claims alleged in the third-
complaint.  That provision requires that supplemental jurisdiction be exercised over 
certain claims if they "are so related to claims in the action within such original
jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy under Article III of the 
United States Constitution." The claims against the directors are far removed from the 
original "case" or "controversy" that the Bank brought to collect the debt, and are 
analytically separate from the counterclaims that the Bathgate defendants asserted against 
the Bank.  Although the claims against the directors and the counterclaims against the 
Bank may arise from the same transaction or common set of facts, Judge Cowen is not 
comfortable with holding that the claims alleged in the third-party complaint meet the 
requirement of being part of the same "case or controversy under Article III," over which 
the district court exercised original jurisdiction (that is, the bank's action to collect 
the debt), as § 1367 provides. 
 
 Judge Cowen believes the district court should have dismissed the third party 
complaint under § 1367(c).   The district court dismissed, without trial, the 
counterclaims the Bathgate defendants asserted against the Bank.  The claims against the 
directors raise novel and complex issues of state law, which in the view of Judge Cowen 
are better adjudicated by New Jersey courts.  Furthermore, the behavior of the directors 
was not the normal exercise of business judgment, but bordered on partisan politics, wich 
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those made parties to the original action may be made parties to a counterclaim or cross
claim in accordance with the provisions of Rules 19 and 20."   
Rule 13(h) only authorizes the court to join additional persons in 
order to adjudicate a counterclaim or cross-claim that already is 
before the court or one that is being asserted at the same time the 
addition of a nonparty is sought.  This means that a counterclaim or 
cross-claim may not be directed solely against persons who are not 
already parties to the original action, but must involve at least one 
existing party. 
C.A. Wright, A. Miller, M. K. Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure, Vol. 6, § 1435, at 
270-71.  The counterclaims against the FDIC have been dismissed.  Moreover, at the time 
the district court denied the Bathgate defendants' motion for leave to amend their third
party complaint against the Bank directors, the district court already had granted summary 
judgment in favor of the FDIC on the FDIC's claims against the Bathgate defendants and on 
the Bathgate defendants' counterclaims against the FDIC. However, at the time that the 
pleading against the Bank directors was filed, the Bathgate defendants' counterclaims 
against the FDIC remained before the district court.  Thus, the Bathgate defendants 
properly joined the Bank directors as additional parties to the counterclaim pursuant to 
Rule 13(h), which the district court cited in its order dismissing the counterclaims.
                                                                                          
may persuade the New Jersey courts to provide some remedy.  According to Judge Cowen, 
these reasons counsel that the district court decline to take jurisdiction over the claims 
alleged in the third-party complaint. 
 
 
0Our conclusion is consistent with our decision in In re Texas Eastern Transmission Corp. 
PCB. Contamination Ins. Coverage Litig., 15 F.3d 1230, 1237 n.5 (3d Cir. 1994).  In that 
case, the defendant argued that the district court did not properly exercise its 
discretionary authority to join counterclaim defendants pursuant to Rule 13(h) because the 
district court made no reference to Rule 13(h).  The defendant also argued that its 
counterclaim was prohibited by Rule 13(h) "inasmuch as under the rule a 'counterclaim . . 
. may not be directed solely against persons who are not already parties to the original 
action.'" Id. (citing Baltimore & Ohio R. Co. v. Central Ry. Services, Inc., 636 F. Supp. 
782, 786 (E.D. Pa. 1986)).  We rejected the defendant's arguments, holding that "the 
district court implicitly found in personam jurisdiction" over the additional counterclaim 
defendants, and that the defendant's counterclaim "was not directed solely against the 
counterclaim defendants," but was also directed against the plaintiff.  Id. 
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  Moreover, in In re Texas Eastern Transmission Corp. PCB. Contamination Ins. 
Coverage Litig., 15 F.3d 1230, 1236-37 (3d Cir. 1994), we held that the district court had 
"[a]ncillary subject matter jurisdiction . . . over additional party defendants to a 
compulsory counterclaim, or over third party defendants," and that Congress "confirmed the 
principle of ancillary jurisdiction over counterclaim defendants in the enactment of the 
Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, 28 U.S.C. §1367."  Section 1367 provides in pertinent 
part that district courts "shall have supplemental jurisdiction over all . . . claims that 
are so related to claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that they form 
part of the same case or controversy under Article III of the United States Constitution." 
28 U.S.C. § 1367(a).0  Thus, we conclude that the district court had subject matter 
jurisdiction over the Bathgate defendants' claims against the Bank directors.0       
 As noted above, the district court denied the Bathgate defendants' motion for 
leave to amend their "third-party" complaint against the Bank directors because it 
concluded that their proposed amendments would be futile.  FDIC v. Bathgate et al., Civ. 
No. 91-2779 (consolidated), Memorandum and Order at 5 (D.N.J. July 19, 1993) (see Bathgate 
defendants' App. III at 1041).  Rule 15(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
authorizes a party to amend its pleadings "as a matter of course at any time before a 
responsive pleading is served."  In this case, although no responsive pleading had been 
filed, the district court concluded that "[r]ather than incur the added expense, delay, 
and inefficiency of permitting the amendment and then considering a motion to dismiss at a 
later date, the Court [would] focus[] on the ultimate issue of whether the motion to amend 
should be denied as futile."  FDIC v. Bathgate et al., Civ. No. 91-2779 (consolidat
Memorandum and Order at 2 (D.N.J. July 19, 1993) (see Bathgate defendants' App. III at 
                     
0The Judicial Improvement Act of 1990 became operative on December 1, 1990, before the 
claims in this case were filed. 
0We do note however, that district courts "may decline to exercise supplemental 
jurisdiction . . . [if] the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has 
original jurisdiction."  28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). 
44 
1038).  The futility of amendment is one of the factors that a trial court may consider in 
denying a motion to amend.  See Averbach v. Rival Mfg. Co., 879 F.2d 1196, 1203 (3d Cir. 
1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1023, 110 S.Ct. 726 (1990).  We review the district court's 
denial of a motion to amend for abuse of discretion.  Id.     
 The Bathgate defendants argue that the district court erred in denying their 
motion for leave to amend their  
third-party complaint because the amended complaint stated causes of action for 
intentional interference with contractual relations and prospective economic advantage, 
slander of credit and title, violation of the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act, 
misrepresentation, and tortious breach of the duty of good faith. See Bathgate defendants' 
Br. at 34-41.0 
 The district court held that the Bathgate defendants' claims for slander of 
credit and slander of title failed because they rested on the allegation that the Bank 
directors published false statements indicating that the Bathgate defendants were in 
default when it already had held that the Bathgate defendants "in fact, were in default."  
FDIC v. Bathgate et al., Civ. No. 91-2779 (consolidated), Memorandum and Order at 3 
(D.N.J. July 19, 1993) (see Bathgate defendants' App. III at 1039).  We agree that in 
light of the district court's holding and our decision to affirm that holding, the motion 
to amend the slander claims remains futile.  Moreover, the Bathgate defendants' 
allegations, see Bathgate defendants' App. III at 1198-99, do not satisfy the pleading 
requirements for defamation claims because they do not identify the alleged defamatory 
statements or the source of the defamatory statements with sufficient specificity.  
Nanavati v. Burdette Tomlin Memorial Hosp., 857 F.2d 96, 109 (3d Cir. 1988) ("a plaintiff 
must be required to set forth actionable statements with particularity"), cert. denied
                     
0We apply New Jersey law to determine whether the Bathgate defendants' claims against the 
Bank directors were futile because both parties briefed the claims under New Jersey law, 
and neither party asserted that federal law or the law of any other state was applicable.
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489 U.S. 1078, 109 S.Ct. 1528 (1989); Zoneraich v. Overlook Hosp., 514 A.2d 53, 63 (N.J. 
Super. Ct. App. Div.) ("In the case of a complaint charging defamation, plaintiff must 
plead facts sufficient to identify the defamatory words, their utterer and the fact of 
their publication. . . .  A plaintiff may be permitted to bolster a defamation cause of 
action through discovery, but not to file a conclusory complaint to find out if one 
exists."), certif. denied, 526 A.2d 126 (N.J. 1986). 
 The district court held that the Bank directors could not be liable on the 
Bathgate defendants' claims of intentional interference with contractual relations and 
prospective economic advantage, because the court in Sammon v. Watchung Hills Bank for 
Sav., 611 A.2d 674 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1992), held that "an employee cannot be held 
liable for an act that is otherwise a tort when the employee is exercising a privilege of 
the principal."  FDIC v. Bathgate et al., Civ. No. 91-2779 (consolidated), Memorandum and 
Order at 3-4 (D.N.J. July 19, 1993) (see Bathgate defendants' App. III at 1039-40).  The 
district court also based its holding on Printing Mart-Morristown v. Sharp Elecs. Corp.
563 A.2d 31, in which the court declined to decide whether "employees [ever] can be 
answerable for interfering with their employer's prospective contractual relationship," 
id. at 761, and stated that "[u]ltimate resolution of the question of whether an employee 
of a party to a prospective economic relationship can be held liable for tortious 
interference may require the Court to create a special cause of action against the 
employee," id. at 763.  FDIC v. Bathgate et al., Civ. No. 91-2779 (consolidated), 
Memorandum and Order at 4 (D.N.J. July 19, 1993) (see Bathgate defendants' App. III at 
1040).   
 In this case, the Bathgate defendants allege that the Bank directors were 
exercising the Bank's authority with regard to the disposition of Bathgate's notes.  
e.g., Bathgate defendants' App. III at 1170, 1196.  Thus, the Bank directors were 
exercising a privilege of the principal.  Since the Bank "cannot be liable on a cause of 
action grounded in unlawful interference with prospective economic advantage, fairness 
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would require that [the directors with the authority to act on the Bank's behalf] . . . be 
similarly insulated from liability on such a cause of action."  Sammon v. Watchung Hills 
Bank for Sav., 611 A.2d at 676.  Moreover, as the Bank directors point out, the Bathgate 
defendants have not cited any authority indicating that the New Jersey Supreme Court has 
created a special cause of action for tortious interference by employees of a party to an 
economic relationship.  See Bank directors' Br. at 15.  We think it would not recognize 
such an action, at least not in the circumstances here.  Thus, we will affirm the district 
court's denial of the motion to amend the Bathgate defendants' tortious interference 
claims against the Bank directors. 
 The district court denied the motion to amend the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act 
claim and common law fraud claim because the amended claims failed to satisfy the 
particularity requirement of Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b).  FDIC v. Bathgate et al., Civ. No. 91
2779 (consolidated), Memorandum and Order at 5 (D.N.J. July 19, 1993) (see Bathgate 
defendants' App. III at 1041).  Although the Bathgate defendants asserted that a 
fraudulent statement was "made to Bathgate that the closing on the February Commitment 
would be deferred beyond April 1, [1991]," they did not assert the identity of the speaker 
or speakers.  Id. at 4-5 (see Bathgate defendants' App. III at 1040-41); see Saporito
Combustion Eng'g Inc., 843 F.2d 666, 675 (3d Cir. 1988) ("[a]lthough the appellants' 
complaint does indicate the general content of the [allegedly fraudulent] representations 
. . . , it does not indicate who the speakers were . . .  or who received the 
information"), vacated on other grounds, 489 U.S. 1049, 109 S.Ct. 1306 (1989).  Moreover, 
"there is no reason to believe that additional information is in the exclusive control of 
[the third-party defendants]."  Saporito v. Combustion Eng'g Inc., 843 F.2d at 675. 
 It is true that "in the case of corporate fraud, plaintiffs cannot be expected 
to have personal knowledge of the details of corporate internal affairs."  Craftmatic Sec. 
Litig. v. Kraftsow, 890 F.2d 628, 645 (3d Cir. 1989).  However, the Bathgate defendants 
assert individual fraud by the Bank directors.  Furthermore, in Craftmatic, we stated that 
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"even under a non-restrictive application of the rule [9(b)], pleaders must allege that 
the necessary information lies within defendants' control, and their allegations must be 
accompanied by a statement of facts upon which the allegations are based." Craftmatic
F.2d at 645.  In other words, "plaintiffs must accompany their allegations with facts 
indicating why the charges against defendants are not baseless and why additional 
information lies exclusively within defendants' control."  Id. at 646.  The Bathgate 
defendants did not allege expressly that the necessary information lies within the third
party defendants' control nor did they provide a statement of facts indicating why the 
charges against the Bank directors are not baseless and why additional information lies 
exclusively within the Bank directors' control.  See Bathgate defendants' App. III at 
1201-03.  Thus, we will affirm the district court's decision to deny the motion to amend 
the claims alleging fraud. 
 Finally, the district court held that the Bathgate defendants' amendment to its 
claim for breach of the duty of good faith would be futile because "in a lender-borrower 
relationship, there is no independent duty beyond that parties' contractual duties," 
v. Bathgate et al., Civ. No. 91-2779 (consolidated), Memorandum and Order at 5 (D.N.J. 
July 19, 1993) (see Bathgate defendants' App. III at 1041) (citing Washington Steel
v. TW Corp., 602 F.2d 594, 599-601 (3d Cir. 1979), overruled on other grounds by Clark
K-Mart Corp., 979 F.2d 965, 967 n.4 (3d Cir. 1992)), and "'remedies in tort relating to a 
breach of contract may not be maintained in addition to those established under the 
contract itself in the absence of any independent duty owed by the breaching party to the 
plaintiff,'" id. (quoting International Minerals & Mining Corp. v. Citicorp North America, 
Inc., 736 F. Supp. 587, 597 (D.N.J. 1990)).  We do not reach these issues because, as the 
Bank directors point out, "[e]ven assuming [the Bank] did owe Bathgate some added duty of 
good faith, [the Bathgate defendants] fail to cite a single case for the proposition that 
non-parties to a contract can be held liable for a breach of a contractual duty of good 
faith and fair dealing," and we believe that the New Jersey Supreme Court would not 
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recognize such a claim, at least in the circumstances of this case.  See Bank directors' 
Br. at 25.0  We will affirm the district court's holding with regard to the breach of duty 
of good faith claim on this basis.  Thus, we will affirm in its entirety the district 
court's order denying the Bathgate defendants' motion for leave to amend their complaint 
against the Bank directors. 
 
III. CONCLUSION 
 In reaching our result we have not overlooked that the D'Oench Duhme doctrine 
and section 1823(e) can lead to what might be considered a harsh result.  Nevertheless, it 
seems to us that the federal precedents and the applicable New Jersey law have compelled 
our outcome.  Consequently, the orders of the district court of March 18, 1993, and July 
19, 1993, will be affirmed. 
                     
0The Bank Directors also allege that the Bathgate defendants other than Bathgate have no 
standing to sue the Bank directors as third-party beneficiaries of the agreement allegedly 
reflected in the February letter.  In light of our disposition of the Bathgate defendants' 
claims against the Bank directors, we need not reach this issue. 
